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CONCEALED FIREARM LICENSING AND THE NEED
FOR EXPANDED DISCRETION IN THE USE OF
CRIMINAL RECORDS
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Richard Idrovo possessed a license to carry a concealed
firearm in Illinois for less than two years1 before he murdered his girl-
friend and turned the gun on himself inside of a busy business in Chi-
cago’s downtown “Loop” area.2  Idrovo held a lawful concealed carry
permit despite his history of domestic violence.3  The Illinois State Po-
lice conducted a background check in perfect accordance with the law,
but Idrovo’s criminal records from the mid-1990s did not show up
through the normal channels; no warning signs emerged, so nobody
objected.4  Unfortunately, this situation is not unique to Illinois.5  In
the year 2000, the Los Angeles Times published a study finding that
hundreds of criminals, including felons, were licensed to carry a con-
cealed firearm in Texas.6  Although society cannot predict who will
commit heinous crimes using a lawfully licensed firearm, we can limit
those with violent pasts from gaining access to firearms in the first
place.7
A variety of entities other than the criminal justice system now util-
ize criminal history record8 searches.9  The inescapable reality of mod-
1. Illinois began accepting applications for concealed carry licenses in January of 2014, less
than two years before the murder-suicide in August 2015.  Press Release, Ill. State Police, Illinois
State Police Release Concealed Carry License Application Numbers (Jan. 7, 2014), http://
www.isp.state.il.us/media/pressdetails.cfm?ID=776.
2. See 2 Dead in Murder-Suicide at Chicago Loop Business, ABC7 CHI. (Aug. 14, 2015), http://
abc7chicago.com/news/2-shot-to-death-inside-loop-loan-store/930752/.
3. Editorial: Concealed Gun Law Allowing Questionable People to Carry, CHI. SUN-TIMES
(Aug. 27, 2015, 7:05 PM), http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/editorial-concealed-gun-law-allow
ing-questionable-people-to-carry/ [hereinafter Editorial: Concealed Gun Law].
4. Id.
5. William C. Rempel & Richard A. Serrano, Felons Get Concealed Gun Licenses Under
Bush’s ‘Tough’ Law, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/oct/03/news/mn-
30319.
6. Id.
7. Thirty-nine states require a license before an individual is legally allowed to carry a firearm
in public. Concealed Weapons Permitting, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://smart
gunlaws.org/concealed-weapons-permitting-policy-summary/#state (last visited Jan. 7, 2017).
8. Federal law defines “criminal history records” as “information collected by criminal justice
agencies on individuals consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, deten-
tions, indictments, or other formal criminal charges, and any disposition arising therefrom, in-
935
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ern society is that individuals can now expect that a criminal records
check will be used to evaluate them for noncriminal justice purposes
throughout their lifetime.10  Eligibility for both government and pri-
vate employment, government licensing, and public assistance often
hinge on the results of a background check.11  Such is the case particu-
larly in the context of regulating firearm ownership.12  All fifty states
allow individuals to carry a loaded firearm in public,13 but as of 2017
only thirty-nine states actively regulate the activity.14
In July 2013, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a man-
date ordering the state of Illinois to adopt legislation permitting the
concealed carriage of firearms in public,15 making Illinois the final
state in the union to legalize the activity.16  Illinois, wishing to main-
tain strict control over the proliferation of handguns in public, con-
structed a permitting scheme that scrupulously examines each
applicant.  The scheme requires the Illinois State Police to conduct a
criminal background check on every applicant,17 and the scheme al-
lows for local law enforcement’s discretionary input during licensing
determinations.18  Local law enforcement officials, however, have
raised policy concerns with Illinois’ concealed carry licensing pro-
gram.19  Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart expressly advocated for
cluding acquittal, sentencing, correctional supervision, or release . . .”  42 U.S.C.
§ 14616(b)(4)(A) (2012).
9. See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Crimi-
nal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177–78 (2008).
10. Federal law defines “noncriminal justice purposes” as “uses of criminal history records for
purposes authorized by Federal or State law other than purposes relating to criminal justice
activities, including employment suitability, licensing determinations, immigration and naturali-
zation matters, and national security clearances.”  42 U.S.C. § 14616(b)(18).
11. Federal, state, and local governments often mandate a background check for certain posi-
tions of public employment and occupational licensing. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/5
(2014) (“The General Assembly finds that it is in the public interest to protect the . . . citizens of
the State of Illinois from possible harm through a criminal background check of certain health
care workers . . . .”).
12. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act mandated all federally licensed firearm
dealers conduct a background check on transferees before finalizing the transfer.  Pub. L. No.
103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012)); see also National
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics
(last visited Jan. 9, 2017).
13. Concealed Weapons Permitting, supra note 7. R
14. Id.
15. 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
16. Mary Ann Ahern & Lauren Petty, Illinois Becomes Last State to Approve Concealed
Carry, NBC CHI. (July 9, 2013), http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/springfield-show
down-concealed-carry-quinn-214723811.html.
17. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/25 (2014).
18. Id. § 15.
19. See Dart: Concealed Carry Approval Process Flawed, ABC7 CHI. (Dec. 17, 2013, 3:34
PM), http://abc7chicago.com/archive/9363967/; see also Rich Miller, No Excuse for this Loop-
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changes to the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act20 that would al-
low law enforcement agencies access to the Law Enforcement Agency
Database System (LEADS) while evaluating concealed firearm appli-
cations.21  Federal law, however, prohibits the use of criminal records
similar to those available in LEADS for noncriminal justice purposes
like concealed carry licensing.22  Under current law, state licensing
bodies may only consider criminal records with “positive identifica-
tion”—records verified by fingerprints—in conjunction with the li-
censing determination.23
This Comment argues in favor of an exception for concealed fire-
arm licensing to the federal requirements that criminal justice records
must be supported by positive identification when used in the context
of noncriminal justice purposes.  This exception would manifest
through state and federal recognition of the unique nature of con-
cealed firearm licensing and the states’ interest in unfettered access to
the full range of criminal history records related to prospective con-
cealed firearm licensees.
Part II discusses the federal databases used for storing, searching,
and disseminating criminal records, as well as the regulations restrict-
ing the use of these databases.  Part II focuses on the rationale behind
these regulations, including how the regulations impact state laws and
practices, particularly Illinois’ concealed firearms licensing frame-
work.24  Part III contends that federal regulations should be amended
to make way for the permissive use of criminal records not based on
positive identification during concealed carry licensing determinations
by the states, and further analyzes the public policy implications of
limiting the background check systems through which law enforce-
ment may access an applicant’s criminal history records and use the
records as foundation for their objection to, or denial of, a concealed
firearm permit.25  Part IV discusses the implications of these reforms
on the actual process of administering a concealed firearm program
and its associated costs.26  Part V of this Comment concludes by offer-
hole, CAPITOL FAX (Aug. 28, 2015), http://capitolfax.com/2015/08/28/no-excuse-for-this-loophole/
.
20. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/1–999 (2014).
21. See Dart, supra note 19. R
22. 28 C.F.R. § 20.33 (2016) (showing that there is no provision allowing use of criminal his-
tory for concealed carry licensing).  The regulation applies to all government licensing purposes.
Id.  This Comment discusses the distinguishing features between concealed carry licensing and
the majority of other regulated activities.
23. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. R
24. See infra notes 28–165 and accompanying text. R
25. See infra notes 166–233 and accompanying text. R
26. See infra notes 234–55 and accompanying text. R
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ing suggestions as to how interested parties can reconcile these re-
forms to achieve mutually beneficial results.27
II. BACKGROUND
Each state maintains a criminal record repository responsible for
collecting and centralizing criminal record data.28  Criminal justice
agencies within each jurisdiction generate criminal records through
policing, investigations, and general operations.29  The collected data
incudes fingerprints, arrests records, criminal charges, and disposi-
tions.30  In 1967, the federal government launched the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) to serve as an “electronic clearinghouse
of crime data.”31  The state repositories serve as the main source of
data for the NCIC.32  Criminal justice agencies around the county may
access the entire NCIC database, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a
year, in exchange for providing and maintaining the criminal records
data.33  The criminal justice agency that created the record is responsi-
ble for the entry, modification, and removal of records; the federal
government merely serves as the custodian of the computer network
and NCIC files.34  By 2014, NCIC contained approximately twelve
million records.35
Similarly, the federal government developed the Integrated Auto-
mated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), which assembles
fingerprint data sourced by each state.36  Today, IAFIS is the largest
27. See infra note 254 and accompanying text. R
28. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY
BACKGROUND CHECKS 13 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 9, at 180. R
31. National Crime Information Center (NCIC), FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ncic
(last visited Jan. 9, 2017).
32. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 13. R
33. National Crime Information Center, supra note 31. R
34. Id.
35. Id.  The NCIC database consists of several components housing files of many different
natures:
The NCIC database currently consists of 21 files. There are seven property files con-
taining records of stolen articles, boats, guns, license plates, parts, securities, and vehi-
cles.  There are 14 persons files, including: Supervised Release; National Sex Offender
Registry; Foreign Fugitive; Immigration Violator; Missing Person; Protection Order;
Unidentified Person; Protective Interest; Gang; Known or Appropriately Suspected
Terrorist; Wanted Person; Identity Theft; Violent Person; and National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (NICS) Denied Transaction.
Id.
36. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 14. R
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single biometric database in the world.37  IAFIS stores digital, high-
resolution images of both paper fingerprint cards38 and “live-scanned”
records.39  As with the other shared databases, nearly every criminal
justice organization in the country has constant access to data con-
tained in IAFIS.40
The Federal Bureau of Investigation maintains the Interstate Identi-
fication Index (III), an index of criminal history records of federal and
state offenders.41  The III is called a “pointer-system” because it al-
lows the FBI “to direct [criminal records] searchers to the states con-
taining records on the subject of the search . . . and allows searchers to
obtain this information directly from the state repository where the
information is located.”42  In effect, the III allows criminal justice
agencies to quickly and efficiently determine if a particular individual
has a criminal record anywhere in the country.43  The III includes
identification data such as name, birth date, race, sex, and fingerprint
records.44  The III also cross-references and groups data created by
multiple states regarding the same individual.45  Every record indexed
in the III is associated with a fingerprint submission to IAFIS.46
Finally, the FBI maintains the National Instant Criminal Back-
ground Check System (NICS), to “instantly determine whether a pro-
spective buyer [of a firearm] is eligible to buy firearms.”47  Almost
every firearm transfer is first subject to a name check through NICS.48
This section discusses the findings regarding the reliability of criminal
37. Privacy Impact Assessment Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS)/Next Generation Identification (NGI) Biometric Interoperability, FBI, https://
www.fbi.gov/services/records-management/foipa/privacy-impact-assessments/iafis-ngi-biometric-
interoperability (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Privacy Impact Assessment].
38. This process involves the “ink stain” method by which the subject transfers an imprint of
their fingerprints onto a paper card. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 92. R
39. Id. at 14.  The “live-scanned” method means “the original fingerprint is collected on a
machine that captures the fingerprint image digitally, without the involvement of paper prints.”
Id.
40. Privacy Impact Assessment, supra note 37. R
41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 15. R
42. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 9, at 182. R
43. NAT’L TASK FORCE ON INTERSTATE IDENTIFICATION INDEX NAME CHECK EFFICACY, IN-
TERSTATE IDENTIFICATION INDEX NAME CHECK EFFICACY: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK
FORCE TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL 21 (1999), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iiince.pdf
[hereinafter NAT’L TASK FORCE].
44. Id.
45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 15. R
46. Id.  The III requires a complete set of ten rolled fingerprints (one for each finger). Id. at
15–16.
47. National Instant Criminal Background Check System, supra note 12.  More than two hun- R
dred million checks have been conducted through the NICS system since its creation in 1998. Id.
48. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act mandates all federally licensed firearm
dealers to conduct a background check on transferees before finalizing the transfer.  18 U.S.C.
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records searches, efforts to maximize that reliability, and the constitu-
tionality of concealed firearm regulations.  It concludes by explaining
the scheme Illinois employs to conduct background checks and make
the determination whether to issue or deny a concealed firearm
license.
A. Reliability of Criminal Records Searches
Criminal records in the III may be accessed by two methods: name
checks and fingerprint searches.49  Name checks may be conducted by
utilizing any of the personal identifiers stored by the III such as birth
date, race, sex, Social Security Number, and the subject’s name.50  The
drawback of name-based searches is the degree of inaccuracy in the
results.51  The National Task Force on Interstate Identification Index
Efficacy issued a study of error rates in background checks for Florida
employment or occupational licensing, public housing, and volunteer
applicants between October 1998 and January 1999.52  The study had
two error types: “false negatives,” which incorrectly indicate the sub-
ject of the search does not have a criminal record, and conversely
“false positives,” which incorrectly associate a subject with a criminal
record.53  The study found that III name checks returned false nega-
tives in 11.7% of all applicants with a verified criminal background
(1.3% of total searches) and false positives in 5.5% of all applications
without a criminal background (4.9% of total searches).54  Fingerprint
searches, on the other hand, compare the biometric data of the finger-
print files and are believed to produce a more reliable and true re-
sult.55  The study does not report its findings as to the accuracy of
fingerprint searches, but it suggests they could be 94% to 98% accu-
rate.56  The study also suggests newer computerized fingerprint sys-
tems may reach 99% to 99.5% accuracy.57  The federal government
responded to the concern of inaccurate criminal records with policies
creating onerous restrictions on the use of all criminal records.
§ 922 (2012).  Section 922(g)(1) was held unconstitutional as applied in Binderup v. Attorney
Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-983 (U.S. Feb. 6, 2017).
49. NAT’L TASK FORCE, supra note 43, at 21–22. R
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 21–22.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 22.
54. Id. at 6–7.  The study reported that 1252 out of 10,673 positively identified files were re-
turned as false negatives (1.3% of all 93,274 applicants in the study).
55. NAT’L TASK FORCE, supra note 43, at 22. R
56. Id.
57. Id. at 22 n.4.
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B. The National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact
In October of 1998, President Clinton signed into law the National
Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact (the “Compact”).58  The
Compact created the legal framework for a reciprocal interstate infra-
structure through which the federal government and states can re-
quest and exchange criminal records for noncriminal justice
purposes.59  The Compact requires criminal records for use with non-
criminal justice purposes to be based on “positive identification” tech-
niques.60  “Positive Identification” is defined as a “determination,
based upon a comparison of fingerprints or other equally reliable bio-
metric identification techniques, that the subject of a record search is
the same person as the subject of a criminal history record or records
indexed in the III System.”61  The technique relied upon most com-
monly is fingerprint comparison.62  Therefore, a criminal history
records search is considered to satisfy “positive identification” once
verified against a fingerprint record.63  A record is not based on posi-
tive identification when the identification is “based solely upon a com-
parison of subjects’ names or other non-unique identification
characteristics or numbers, or combinations thereof . . . .”64
The Department of Justice maintains, as a matter of policy, that fin-
gerprint-confirmed searches are more desirable than the alternative
name-based search method.65  The Compact and related federal regu-
lations promote this policy by generally limiting name checks of the
III to criminal justice purposes.66  Federal law defines “criminal jus-
tice” to include “activities relating to the detection, apprehension, de-
tention, pretrial release, post-trial release, prosecution, adjudication,
correctional supervision, or rehabilitation of accused persons or crimi-
nal offenders.”67  The policy of limiting name checks to criminal jus-
tice purposes aims to reduce the dual risk of false positives and false
58. Pub. L. No. 105-251, tit. II, § 127, 112 Stat. 1870, 1876 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14616
(2012)).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 14616(a).
60. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 3–5. R
61. 42 U.S.C. § 14616(b)(20).
62. Id.  The fingerprint comparison is the gold standard of positive identification techniques
because it is the only method explicitly approved by the Compact.  “Positive identification” is
also achievable by “equally reliable biometric identification techniques,” though the Compact
does not define what such an “equally reliable” technique may be. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. A recent report by former United States Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez made this
position clear. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 26. R
66. Id. at 16.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 14616(b)(6).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL305.txt unknown Seq: 8 30-AUG-17 13:34
942 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:935
negatives in noncriminal justice purposes while allowing law enforce-
ment to quickly assess an individual’s criminal history in situations
where time is of the essence.68  In effect, the policy “balances the need
for expediency with the added risk that the name-based search will
result in a false positive or false negative match.”69  Name checks may
also be used for noncriminal justice purposes so long as the record is
considered to have been positively identified.70  Name checks of
records supported by positive identification will most typically be used
during investigations regarding “employment suitability, licensing de-
terminations, immigration and naturalization matters, and national se-
curity clearances.”71  The policies implemented through the Compact
have helped reduce inaccuracy in the national system, but small flaws
in the system’s design remain, and the potential for errors still exists.
C. Right to Correct a Criminal Record
Federal regulations place additional burdens on a noncriminal jus-
tice agency attempting to use criminal records in a noncriminal justice
context.72  Federal regulations require that a noncriminal justice
agency making a licensing determination must allow an applicant the
opportunity to correct the record before the agency makes the final
determination.73  This right reflects the broad policy goal of ensuring
that criminal records are as complete and accurate as possible.74  The
subject of a criminal record may submit a request to correct the record
through the FBI, and the FBI will direct the request to the originating
agency75 or state.76  States generally maintain more complete files
than the federal government.77  For example, roughly fifty percent of
the FBI-maintained records contain information about the disposition
of the underlying criminal charge, compared with between seventy
and eighty percent of state records.78
68. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 26. R
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also NAT’L TASK FORCE, supra note 43, at 21. R
71. 42 U.S.C. § 14616(b)(18).
72. 28 C.F.R. § 50.12(b) (2016).
73. Id. (referencing 28 C.F.R. § 16.34 (2016)).
74. “This policy is intended to ensure that all relevant criminal record information is made
available to provide for the public safety and, further, to protect the interests of the prospective
employee/licensee who may be affected by the information or lack of information in an identifi-
cation record.”  28 C.F.R. § 50.12(b).
75. 28 C.F.R. § 16.34.
76. See, e.g., Updating an Existing Criminal History Record, WASH. ST. PATROL, http://
www.wsp.wa.gov/crime/chupdates.htm#compromised (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 27. R
78. Id.
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D. Constitutionality of Concealed Carry Regulations
Between 1939 and 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court decision of United
States v. Miller79 controlled the general understanding of Second
Amendment protections.80  In Miller, the Court held that the constitu-
tional right to possess a weapon is protected only so long as it has
“some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia . . . .”81  In 2008, District of Columbia v. Heller82
expanded that understanding and held that the Second Amendment
protected the right to possess a firearm for the purpose of self-de-
fense.83  The holding in Heller was explicitly limited to self-defense
inside your home.84  Two years later in McDonald v. City of Chicago,85
the Court held that the Second Amendment is applicable to the
states.86  Together, the Court established a new line of Second
Amendment jurisprudence expanding the scope of how courts inter-
pret and apply the Second Amendment; however, these limited deci-
sions did not address the issue of whether the Second Amendment
protected the right to possess a firearm outside the confines of the
home.87
Soon after Heller, the Circuit Courts of Appeals began to address
the constitutionality of heightened statutory restrictions for the issu-
ance of concealed carry licenses.88  The Circuits are currently split as
to whether the Second Amendment protections extend beyond the
home.89  Four of the five circuit courts to address this issue have held
heightened requirements such as “good cause” or “justifiable need”
79. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
80. Id. at 178.
81. Id.
82. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
83. Id. at 635.
84. Id. (“[T]he District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amend-
ment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the
purpose of immediate self-defense.”).
85. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
86. Id. at 750.
87. Justine E. Johnson-Makuch, Note, Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry: A Five-Cir-
cuit Shoot-Out, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2757, 2766–67 (2015).
88. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), rev’g 742 F.3d
1144 (9th Cir. 2014); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 428 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712
F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 2013); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013); Moore
v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 83
(2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2010).
89. Johnson-Makuch, supra note 87, at 2775. R
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are constitutionally permissible restrictions on the right to carry a fire-
arm in public.90
In United States v. Marzzarella,91 the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals interpreted Heller to require a two-prong test when analyzing
Second Amendment challenges: (1) whether the challenged law bur-
dens conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment, and
if it does, (2) whether the law survives some form of means-end scru-
tiny.92  Courts typically apply one of three levels of means-end scru-
tiny when reviewing cases concerning regulation of the Second
Amendment: rational-basis review, intermediate scrutiny, or strict
scrutiny.93  The Heller decision explicitly forbids the use of the ra-
tional-basis test when evaluating regulations of the Second Amend-
ment.94  In Heller, the Supreme Court also noted that the opinion
“should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws for-
bidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms.”95  The Court noted that this list is
not exhaustive.96
Prior close analysis of the circuit split suggests that courts tend to
rely on intermediate scrutiny when determining the constitutionality
of regulations restricting the right to carry a firearm in public.97  If
courts apply intermediate scrutiny to regulations of the Second
Amendment, the issue becomes whether a regulation is justified by a
“significant, substantial, or important” state interest with a “reasona-
ble fit between that asserted interest and the challenged law.”98
Courts generally agree the states have “undoubtedly, a significant,
90. Id. at 2784–91.  While the focus of this Comment does not seek to resolve the dispute
among the circuits, a discussion of the split does lend itself to this Comment’s general proposi-
tion that states have a strong interest in regulating concealed carry licensing.
91. 614 F.3d 85.
92. Id. at 89.  The first prong of the Marzzarella test is outside the scope of this Comment, so
instead the Comment follows the analysis of the courts in Drake, 724 F.3d at 430, and Woollard,
712 F.3d at 876, and proceeds directly to the means-end analysis.  For a thorough discussion as to
whether the protections of the Second Amendment extend beyond the home, see generally
Johnson-Makuch, supra note 87. R
93. Drake, 724 F.3d at 435.
94. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27.  Outside of this footnote, the Court
purposefully avoided determining the issue of which level of scrutiny would apply. Id. at 634–35.
95. Id. at 626–27.
96. Id. at 627 n.26 (suggesting the Second Amendment allows for the regulation of firearms
based on individualized factors such as prior criminal history).
97. Johnson-Makuch, supra note 87, at 2781. R
98. Drake, 724 F.3d at 436.
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substantial and important interest in protecting its citizens’ safety.”99
Not all courts agree, however, as to the extent that states may restrict
the Second Amendment to satisfy that interest.
E. Illinois’ Concealed Carry Statute
In December 2012, the Seventh Circuit applied the Heller and Mc-
Donald frameworks and declared Illinois’ wholesale ban on the right
to carry a firearm in public unconstitutional for violating the right to
self-protection outside the home.100  In doing so, the court struck
down Illinois’ statutes for Unlawful Use of Weapons (UUW)101 and
Aggravated Unlawful Use of Weapons (AUUW),102 both of which
criminalized carrying a loaded firearm in public outside of the
home.103  The court stayed its mandate for 180 days to allow the Illi-
nois General Assembly to develop a program that allowed for lawful
possession of a concealed firearm in public consistent with its opin-
ion.104  Illinois did not appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, so as
a federal matter, the issue is closed.
On the state level, in Illinois v. Aguilar,105 the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed a lower court’s opinion and also declared both the Illi-
nois UUW and AUUW statute unconstitutional.106  In response to the
federal and state decisions, the Illinois General Assembly enacted a
plan on the final day of the Spring Legislative Session.107  Governor
Pat Quinn issued an Amendatory Veto,108 which in turn, the General
Assembly promptly overrode.109  The Veto Override, however, came
99. Id. at 437 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).
100. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012).
101. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1 (2012) (amended 2015), prior version invalidated by Moore,
702 F.3d at 942.  For concealed carry purposes, this statute criminalized to “knowingly . . . carr[y]
or possess[ ] in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person . . . any pistol, revolver, stun gun
or taser or other firearm,” except in limited prescribed circumstances. Id. § 24-1(a)(4).
102. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.6 (2012), invalidated by Moore, 702 F.3d at 942.
103. Moore, 702 F.3d at 942.
104. Id.
105. 2013 IL 112116, 2 N.E.3d 321.
106. Id. ¶ 22.
107. See H.B. 183, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).  The Illinois General Assembly
regular session runs from early January until May 31st of each year. See ILL. HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, 100TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPRING SESSION SCHEDULE (2017), http://www.ilga.gov
/house/schedules/2017_Session_Calendar.pdf.
108. Governor’s Message to the Honorable Members of the Illinois House of Representatives,
98th General Assembly, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY (July 2, 2013), http://ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.
asp?DocName=09800HB0183gms&GA=98&SessionId=85&DocTypeId=HB&LegID=69231&
DocNum=183&GAID=12&Session=.
109. See Bill Status of HB0183, 98th Gen. Assembly, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://ilga.gov/legis
lation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=183&GAID=12&GA=98&Doc
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after the 180-day stay of the Moore decision had expired.110  The Illi-
nois General Assembly left the law unclear as to what form of protec-
tions the Second Amendment provided citizens to carry in public for
one month in between the expiration of the stay and the date the new
act took effect.
The product of the General Assembly’s plan was the Firearm Con-
cealed Carry Act (the “Act”),111 which implemented Illinois’ first stat-
ute regulating the lawful carry of a concealed firearm in public.  The
Act stipulates a number of minimum requirements each applicant
must satisfy in order to qualify for a conceal carry license.112  These
requirements include that the applicant (1) is at least twenty-one years
of age; (2) has a currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card
(FOID); (3) has not been convicted of “a misdemeanor involving the
use or threat of physical force or violence . . . within the [five] years
preceding the date of the license application; or [two] or more viola-
tions [of] driving while under the influence;” (4) is not the subject of a
pending arrest warrant; (5) has not been in residual or court-ordered
treatment for alcoholism or drug abuse; and (6) has completed the
prescribed firearms training component.113
The application for a FOID Card can be accessed through the same
website and portal as the concealed carry license, but the two remain
separate endorsements.114  As such, applicants may qualify for a
FOID Card but not qualify for the concealed carry permit.115
All final applications are then submitted to the Illinois State Po-
lice.116  From there, the State Police conduct a comprehensive back-
ground check of each applicant.117  The criminal background check is
TypeID=HB&LegID=69231&SessionID=85 (last visited Jan. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Bill Status of
HB0183].
110. The court stayed its decision for 180 days beginning December 11, 2012, making Illinois’
UUW and AUUW statutes unenforceable on and after June 9, 2013. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 942.
The General Assembly did not override the Governor’s Amendatory Veto until July 9, 2013.
Bill Status of HB0183, supra note 109. R
111. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/1–999 (2014).
112. Id. § 25.
113. Id.
114. Id.  The Illinois State Police has created a single webpage through which applicants can
file each application, but it remains two distinct applications.  Press Release, Ill. State Police,
Officials Aim to Modernize and Expedite Licensing Process for Efficiency (Mar. 6, 2015), http://
www.isp.state.il.us/media/pressdetails.cfm?ID=837.
115. For example, the concealed carry license requirements disqualify an applicant with two
convictions for driving under the influence, whereas as the Firearm Owners Identification Card
requirements do not. Compare 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/25 (2014), with 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/
8 (2014).
116. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/10, 66/30.
117. Id. § 35.
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conducted through a series of state and federal databases including
the NICS mental health reporting databases,118 and “all other availa-
ble records . . . likely to contain information relevant” to an appli-
cant’s qualification to possess a firearm in public.119  If a background
check concludes that an applicant is ineligible based on one of the
factors listed above,120 the State Police must deny the applicant a li-
cense.121  However, the Act provides that if an applicant’s background
check is free of disqualifying results, any law enforcement agency—
typically a County Sheriff or the municipal police department of the
applicant’s current or recent hometown122—may submit an objection
to the applicant being issued a license.123
The Act provides two justifications for which a law enforcement
agency may object to an application.124  First, an objection may be
based “upon a reasonable suspicion that the applicant is a danger to
himself or herself or others, or a threat to public safety.”125  “‘Reason-
able suspicion’ means more than a mere suspicion, but less than prima
facie proof.”126  The Act does not impose further limitations or
thresholds on such an objection other than to require the objecting
agency to provide “any information relevant to the objection.”127  Sec-
ond, the State Police must object when an applicant has five or more
arrests, for any reason, within the seven years preceding the applica-
tion, or has three or more arrests within the seven years preceding the
application for “any combination of gang-related offenses . . . .”128
118. One of the primary databases maintained by the state is the Illinois Department of
Human Services’ Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) Mental Health Reporting System,
which allows “mandated [mental health] reporters . . . [the ability] to report an individual that is
receiving mental health treatment or is determined to be a clear or present danger.” Illinois
Firearm Owners Identification (FOID) Mental Health Reporting System, ILL. DEP’T HUM. SERVS.
(Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=37393 (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
119. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT 66/35.
120. Id. § 25.
121. Id. § 10(f).
122. The Act provides that the State Police shall maintain a database of all applications, and
the database must be accessible and searchable to all federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies, State’s Attorneys, and the Attorney General. Id. § 10(i).  From this database, local law
enforcement is able to search for all applications filed by residents within its jurisdiction and can
compare it to relevant internal records for objectionable history. Id.
123. Id. § 15(a).
124. Id. § 15(a)–(b).
125. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/15(a).
126. Peter Petrou, Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the Burden of Proof in Forfei-
ture Proceedings Arising Out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DUKE L.J. 822, 825 (1984).
127. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/10(a).
128. Id. § 15(b).  All arrests must have been entered into the Criminal History Records Infor-
mation (CHRI) System. Id.
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Upon passing all necessary background checks, the Illinois State Po-
lice must issue the applicant a license to carry a concealed firearm
where no objection is filed and the applicant is deemed eligible.129  It
should be noted that the Illinois State Police is the only agency bound
by statute to object if it determines any of the proscribed disqualifying
criteria are satisfied.130  Local law enforcement agencies have no such
affirmative obligation, though they are certainly free to exercise their
discretionary authority to file an objection to any application.131
Some local law enforcement agencies have expressed displeasure
with the tools they are allowed to use in determining whether to ob-
ject based on an applicant’s criminal background.132  For example,
Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart believes his department cannot prop-
erly make a determination of public safety based on the background
check services statutorily allowed.133  Dart suggests granting law en-
forcement permission to access LEADS for the purposes of evaluating
concealed firearm applicants.134  State and federal law jointly prohibit
the use of LEADS for any licensing purpose because some of the data
available through LEADS derives from criminal records not based on
positive identification.135  Illinois cannot unilaterally grant permission
in light of the federal requirements.
The Illinois State Police operates and maintains the Illinois LEADS
database.136  LEADS allows certified operators access to Computer-
ized Hot Files which contain criminal history records, Illinois Secre-
tary of State data (e.g., motor vehicle registrations and licensed
drivers’ information), the FBI’s National Crime Information Center
(NCIC), and the International Justice and Public Safety Network.137
LEADS is only available to criminal justice agencies within Illinois,
and these agencies constantly update old records and add new
records.138  Information that is unique to LEADS includes records re-
129. Id. § 10(a).
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Editorial: Concealed Gun Law, supra note 3. R
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. “Law enforcement officials who wish to raise an objection to an FCCL applicant shall not
use LEADS to run background checks to determine FCCL eligibility.” ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
20, § 1231.70(a) (2016).
136. Id. § 1240.10(a).
137. ILL. INTEGRATED JUSTICE INFO. SYS., LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES DATA SYSTEM 1
(2002), www.icjia.state.il.us/iijis/public/word/SJIS/SJIS_LEADS.doc; see also ILL. STATE POLICE,
PREPARING TO APPLY FOR LEADS 2000 ACCESS 1 (2013), http://www.isp.state.il.us/docs/9-
056.pdf.
138. ILL. INTEGRATED JUSTICE INFO. SYSTEM, supra note 137, at 1. R
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garding missing persons, wanted persons, gang membership or affilia-
tions, orders of protection, and FOID holders.139  As will be discussed
below, Illinois restricts the use of LEADS to maintain compliance
with federal regulations.
Illinois regulations reflect federal regulations by first requiring users
to satisfy the federal regulatory definition of a “criminal justice
agency.”140  As a government licensing purpose, investigations into a
concealed carry applicant’s background do not satisfy a “criminal jus-
tice purpose.”141  As such, Illinois and federal law prohibit law en-
forcement agencies from accessing  LEADS for concealed firearm
application purposes.142  A collateral result of this constriction is that
law enforcement agencies are statutorily prohibited from using infor-
mation obtained from a LEADS name-check as the foundation of an
objection or even to further support an otherwise freely standing
objection.143
1. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board
The Act established the Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board
(the “Board”) to review and issue a final decision on all applications
subject to a law enforcement objection.144  The Governor appoints
seven commissioners to the Board, each with varying legal and medi-
cal expertise.145  The Board’s directive is to review each application in
light of the objection(s), review the relevant evidence, and make a
determination as to whether the objection should be sustained or
139. Id. at 4.  Some of this information is available through the NCIC, but that information
only relates to criminal history files originating out of state. Id.  Similar information stored the
LEADS Computerized Hot Files is the main source of information derived by Illinois criminal
justice agencies. Id. at 2–3.
140. “The candidate organization must be a criminal justice agency as defined in the U.S.
Department of Justice Regulations on Criminal Justice Information Systems (28 CFR 20, Sub-
part A)” ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1240.30(c)(1)(A).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 14616(b)(6) (2012).
142. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1231.70(a).  To an even greater extent, Illinois forbids the use
of LEADS data for other agencies’ licensing decisions as well.  For example, the Illinois Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services (DCFS) is prohibited from using LEADS in licensing
decisions for childcare providers. ILL. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE #6: USE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY DATABASE SYSTEM (LEADS) 7
(2009), https://www.illinois.gov/dcfs/aboutus/notices/Documents/administrative_procedure_
6.pdf.
143. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1231.70(a).
144. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/20(a) (2016).
145. Of the seven commissioners, the Board must consist of (1) a former federal judge, (2)
two attorneys with experience in the United States Department of Justice, (3) three federal
agents or employees with criminal justice investigative experience, and (4) one licensed physi-
cian or clinical psychologist with experience in diagnosis or treatment of mental illness. Id.  All
commissioners must have at least five years of experience in their respective qualifying roles. Id.
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overruled.146  The Board’s primary determination is whether the ap-
plicant “poses a danger to himself or herself or others, or is a threat to
public safety.”147  The Act provides that the Board’s operative stan-
dard of review is “by a preponderance of the evidence.”148  Therefore,
the Board may only sustain a law enforcement objection if it finds that
the applicant is more likely than not to pose a danger to himself or
herself or others, or is a threat to public safety.149  Absent this show-
ing, the Board must overrule the objection and instruct the State Po-
lice to issue the license.150  Each applicant denied a license is granted
an automatic right to administrative and judicial review.151
2. Constitutionality of the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act
Courts have addressed the constitutional validity of the Board’s
function and role within Illinois’ concealed firearm licensing frame-
work.152  The plaintiffs in Bolton v. Bryant153 and DeServi v. Bryant154
challenged the validity of the Act, claiming that it denied procedural
due process rights conferred by the Second and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.155  Both courts denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and
held the respective plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a claim for violation
of procedural due process.156  Perhaps anticipating impending consti-
tutional invalidity, the Illinois State Police adopted emergency admin-
istrative rules creating new notice requirements for applicants under
review by the Board.157  These emergency amendments required the
Board to send notice to the applicant regarding the nature of the ob-
jection, as well as the date, time, and location of the hearing.158  These
emergency regulations were only activated if the objections “appears
146. Id. § 20(e).
147. Id. § 20(g).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/20(g).
151. Id. § 10(f).
152. See generally Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., No. 14-CV-2839, 2015
WL 1275834 (N.D. Ill Mar. 16, 2015); Bolton v. Bryant, 71 F. Supp. 3d 802 (N.D. Ill. 2014);
DeServi v. Bryant, 70 F. Supp. 3d 921 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
153. 71 F. Supp. 3d 802.
154. 70 F. Supp. 3d 921.
155. Bolton, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 813; DeServi, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 927.
156. Bolton, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 812–13; DeServi, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 925–27.
157. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1231.230 (2014) (emergency amendment), http://
www.isp.state.il.us/docs/FirearmsActEmergencyRules.pdf; see Press Release, Ill. State Police, Il-
linois State Police Post Emergency Rules to Address Statutory Framework of the Firearm Con-
cealed Carry Act (July 14, 2014), http://www.isp.state.il.us/media/pressdetails.cfm?ID=810.
Emergency rules may be in effect for a maximum of 150 days. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1, §100.640
(2016).
158. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 2900.140(d) (2016).
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sustainable on its face or in light of any information the [Board] has
obtained.”159  Shortly thereafter, and as a result of the enactment of
these emergency rules, the federal District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois rejected a procedural due process challenge similar
to those previously cited.160  The Board continues to operate as pre-
sumptively constitutional.
Tensions boiled over after an Illinois concealed carry license holder
was involved in a murder-suicide inside of a downtown Chicago busi-
ness.161  Richard Idrovo possessed a valid concealed carry license de-
spite his criminal record history, which included a past order of
protection against him, an arrest for violation of an order of protec-
tion, and an arrest for misdemeanor assault.162  Idrovo was not statu-
torily prohibited from obtaining a concealed firearm permit because
those incidents occurred outside of the five-year period preceding his
application.163  Nevertheless, the Cook County Sheriff contends that
access to LEADS would have alerted law enforcement to Idrovo’s
criminal background and could have served as a basis for an objection
to his application.164  Law enforcement agencies were blind to
Idrovo’s complete criminal history record without access to the infor-
mation located exclusively in LEADS, and without that access no law
enforcement agencies had reason to object to his application.
Federal regulations do not allow criminal justice agencies to use
criminal records generated through everyday policing if those records
are not supported by fingerprint-based “positive identification” tech-
niques.165  In the case of concealed firearm licensing schemes, this cre-
ates a hole in the overall criminal history background of applicants.
This Comment argues in favor of changes to the polices that bridge
this coverage gap.
III. ANALYSIS
The regulations restricting the use of certain criminal records for
noncriminal justice purposes are well intended, but in practice, and
when applied to concealed firearm licensing, these regulations appear
159. Id. § 2900.140(e).  It logically follows that the Board is not required to notify applicants
of every objection if it determines the objection is not likely to result in the denial of the
application.
160. Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., No. 14-CV-2839, 2015 WL
1275834, at *6 (N.D. Ill 2015).
161. See 2 Dead in Murder-Suicide at Chicago Loop Business, supra note 2. R
162. Editorial: Concealed Gun Law, supra note 3. R
163. Id.; see 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/25(3) (2014).
164. Editorial: Concealed Gun Law, supra note 3. R
165. See supra notes 58–71 and accompanying text. R
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to be shortsighted.166  Under certain conditions, reforming these regu-
lations will allow concealed firearm licensing authorities greater ac-
cess to pertinent criminal data without sacrificing the individual’s right
to privacy.167  This Part argues that privacy standards can be main-
tained through the use of intermediary administrative review boards
like the Illinois Concealed Carry Licensing Review Board.  Next, this
Part contends that allowing criminal records not verified by positive
identification will improve public safety in light of the structural defi-
ciencies of the national criminal records databases.  Finally, this Part
suggests methods by which to amend the regulations and justifications
for those particular vehicles.
A. Maintaining Privacy Standards
The 1998 Report of the National Task Force on Interstate Identifi-
cation Index Name Check Efficacy examined the issues relevant to the
United States Attorney General’s position on restrictive use of crimi-
nal records not supported by positive identification.168  The Attorney
General’s privacy concerns at the time primarily revolved around the
use of criminal records for private employment decisions; concealed
firearm licensing was generally not a focus on which that position is
centered or justified.169  While the privacy implications at stake in
concealed firearm licensing are not less significant than those of pri-
vate employment, the risk of erroneous harm to the individual, in gov-
ernment licensing context, is mitigated by the availability of
administrative and judicial review of government action.170  A central
focus of the Attorney General’s report was on the societal risk of hap-
hazardly allowing the use of criminal records in private employment
decisions.171  This risk is twofold: (1) adverse employment determina-
tions based on false positives reported to an employer, and (2) the
lack of a fair opportunity for the subject to correct the record.172  As
the Attorney General correctly observed, “Individuals have a strong
interest in ensuring that fair information practices are followed when
employers and other organizations obtain and use criminal history in-
formation to screen a person for employment or volunteer
suitability.”173
166. Miller, supra note 19. R
167. The federal regulations in question are, generally, found in 28 C.F.R. § 20.
168. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 25. R
169. See id. at 10.
170. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/87 (2014).
171. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 107–08.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1.
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Concealed firearm licensing determinations are not subject to the
same risk and finality as that of unjustified rejections of private em-
ployment.  In Illinois, for example, applications under objection by a
law enforcement agency are sent directly to the Concealed Carry Li-
censing Review Board.174  The Board notifies the applicant of the ob-
jection and gives the applicant an opportunity to present new
evidence to correct the record or suggest that the Board should over-
rule the objection despite the evidence provided by law enforce-
ment.175  Illinois structured the review process anticipating the same
concerns raised by the Attorney General (i.e., the risks of false posi-
tive background checks and fairness).176  The review process requires
notification of the applicant, a request for additional materials rele-
vant to the nature of the objection, and a potential for the applicant to
even offer live testimony before the Board.177  If an applicant is de-
nied a license by final decision of the Board, the aggrieved applicant
may then petition the courts for judicial review of the administrative
decision.178  The risk of an erroneous deprivation based on a false pos-
itive criminal background check result is accounted for and mitigated
by the multiple procedural mechanisms in the Illinois licensing
scheme.179  In the recent federal litigation of Moustakas v. Margolis,180
the court found that with additional involvement of the applicant
under Illinois’ licensing system, “the risk of erroneous deprivation” is
low because the process allows for layers of review and potential in-
volvement of the applicant.181  Considering as much, this Comment
argues that national regulatory policies that do not account for local
mitigation of risk unduly restrict a state from exercising its authority
over matters implicitly reserved to its control.182
One troubling aspect of this position is that the acceptance of a cer-
tain degree of false positives would likely act as a de facto burden
shifting mechanism.183  Illinois is a “shall issue” state, meaning that
the state may not refuse to issue a license to an applicant who satisfies
174. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/20(a).
175. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 2900.140 (2016).
176. See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. R
177. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 2900.140.
178. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/87(a).
179. Such an argument would lend itself to a procedural due process claim, but it would not
account for both pre- and post-deprivation procedures built into the concealed carry licensing
scheme.
180. 154 F. Supp. 3d 719 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
181. Id. at 730.
182. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
183. “De facto” is defined as “actual; existing in fact; having effect even though not formally
or legally recognized.” De Facto, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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all of the prescribed qualifications.184  This, of course, is a legal fallacy;
the mere allowance for subjective law enforcement objection after the
applicant satisfies the objective statutory requirements makes Illinois
a “limited discretion shall issue” state.185  To further understand this
issue, it is helpful to apply familiar tort law principles to this analysis;
“but-for”186 the law enforcement agency’s objection, the applicant
would not be in the position of defending his or her application before
the Board.  The Board is limited in what it may consider when review-
ing an objection: information submitted by (1) the Illinois State Police;
(2) a law enforcement agency; and (3) the applicant.187  As the Illinois
Firearm Concealed Carry Act stands, the initial burden on a law en-
forcement agency is extremely low.188  The standard of “based upon a
reasonable suspicion” is in effect a burden shifting mechanism189—
once the state satisfies its burden of establishing a reasonable suspi-
cion, the burden shifts from the state to the applicant to provide evi-
dence sufficient to overcome the state’s objection.190
Notwithstanding, the concern of burden shifting should not over-
come this Comment’s argument in favor of expanding the scope of
access to criminal records for concealed firearm licensing determina-
tions.  Burden shifting is a foreseeable impact of a simultaneous in-
crease in local law enforcement participation and the access to
criminal records, but the net benefits from a positive impact on public
safety—most significantly reduced gun violence and fewer overall oc-
currences of firearm discharge in public—greatly outweighs the bur-
den on any one citizen.
To this point, one commentator has offered insightful perspective
through an analysis of the use of local law enforcement in New
184. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/10(a) (2014).
185. Concealed Weapons Permitting, supra note 7. R
186. “But-for test” is defined as “[t]he doctrine that causation exists only when the result
would not have occurred without the party’s conduct.” But-For Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
187. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/20(e).  The statute does not restrict the applicant in what they
may submit in order to appeal the Board’s decision.
188. Id.  A law enforcement agency may object based on a “reasonable suspicion” that the
applicant poses a danger, id. § 15(a), but the Board operates on a “preponderance of the evi-
dence” standard. Id. § 20(g).
189. See Petrou supra note 126, at 825 (demonstrating how another statute using “reasonable R
suspicion” is in fact a burden shifting measure).
190. The Board will notify the applicant of the objection and invite them to submit evidence
in support of their application. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 2900.140(d) (2016).  The most direct
reform to address this concern would be to raise the threshold over which a law enforcement
agency may file an objection or to raise the Board’s standard of proof beyond a “preponderance
of the evidence,” but this is merely offered as a remark secondary to the overarching theme of
this Comment.
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Jersey’s concealed carry firearm process.191  The author believed that
resting the exclusive licensing authority in local law enforcement
posed a significant threat to applicants’ interests in a fair review of
applications.  Fairly so, the primary drawbacks of local input are the
potential for abuse and a wide degree of variation in the application
process based on the locale of the applicant.192  On the other hand, a
process that lacks local input would degrade the ability to “screen out
unstable or ‘trouble prone’ individuals.”193  The complete absence of
local input would put public safety in jeopardy because “[t]he same
rationale . . . which supports background checks for criminal convic-
tions and psychological problems serves to justify some local input to
reduce the possibility that as-yet-unconvicted troublemakers will be
issued permits.”194
If we accept that local law enforcement has an important role in the
practice of firearm licensing, then we should also recognize its unique
position to fairly offer evidence otherwise restricted from considera-
tion in other licensing determinations.195  Concealed firearm licensing
is different than almost every other noncriminal justice purpose for
which a background check is required because law enforcement is the
entity charged with overseeing its implementation in most of the
states that regulate the activity; Midwestern states like Indiana, Iowa,
Minnesota, and Missouri all require citizens to file concealed firearm
applications with their chief local law enforcement officer, usually the
County Sheriff.196  Even more so, Illinois requires law enforcement to
conduct only one variety of licensing—firearms.197
Indications that concealed firearm licensing is a unique function of
law enforcement are also apparent in the Attorney General’s Re-
port.198  The Attorney General expressed that “many law enforce-
ment agencies do not believe that the capture and submission of high
volumes of fingerprints for civil employment and licensing purposes is
191. John C. Lenzen, Note, Liberalizing the Concealed Carry of Handguns by Qualified Civil-
ians: The Case for “Carry Reform,” 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1503, 1552–53 (1995).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1552.
194. Id.
195. Law enforcement does not have an equal role in similar government licensing determina-
tions other than to serve as a custodian of criminal records. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra
note 28, at 113. R
196. IND. CODE §§ 35-47-2-1 to -6, 35-47-6-1, 35-47-6-1.3, 35-47-9-1, 35-47-9-2 (2016); IOWA
CODE §§ 724.4, 724.4B, 724.7-.13 (2016); MINN. STAT. § 624.714 (2016); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 571.101 (2016).
197. This includes issuing Firearm Owners Identification Cards and Concealed Carry
Licensing.
198. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 117. R
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related to their law enforcement mission.”199  For most licensing func-
tions, law enforcement is merely a point of access for fingerprinting
acquisition and storage;200 however, in many states, the role of con-
cealed firearm licensing is exclusively within the purview of law en-
forcement agencies.201  In this context, law enforcement agencies are
responsible for every step in the chain—from fingerprinting and con-
ducting background checks to the final determination regarding each
applicant, law enforcement agencies are traditionally the only admin-
istrative body involved in the process.  It serves a much greater func-
tion in concealed firearm licensing that merely serving as a point of
access for fingerprint searches.  This unique nature of concealed fire-
arm licensing is enough to distinguish it from other governmental li-
censing functions such as professional licensure or issuing a Driver’s
License.  Despite the unique nature of law enforcement’s role in this
particular noncriminal justice context, states can minimize risks of
false positives by scaling back the exclusive authority of local law en-
forcement and raising the burden on the state.202
A state should be allowed to employ the use of criminal records not
based on positive identification so long as it simultaneously employs
procedural safeguards designed to reduce the negative effects of false
positives.  These procedural safeguards should only apply to subjec-
tive determinations like an objection based on a reasonable suspicion.
They would not apply to objective determinations based on statutes
mandating automatic disqualification.  States that wish to grant access
to more criminal records could mirror those procedures employed in
Illinois, including automatic review by an administrative body203 and
the applicant’s right to supplement an application with additional in-
formation to be considered along with all relevant materials.204  These
recommended safeguards would promote the reliability of final licens-
ing determination more efficiently than procedures employed by
other states.  Missouri, for example, requires all appeals to go directly
to a circuit court of the state system for review on the judge’s small
claims docket.205  The tens of thousands of applications filed every
year would flood courts and waste valuable judicial resources.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. R
202. Lenzen, supra note 191, at 1552. R
203. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/15(f) (2014).
204. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 2900.140(e) (2016).
205. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 571.114, 571.300, 571.482. (2016).
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B. Structural Flaws in the National Reporting Systems and How the
Positive Identification Requirement Perpetuates
the Problem
“No single source exists that provides complete and up-to-date in-
formation about a person’s criminal history.”206  Major flaws exist
throughout the network of databases that make up our national crimi-
nal background check system.207  Even though large investments into
system upgrades have led to smarter, faster, and more accurate
databases,208 the patchwork nature of the NCIC, III, and NICS tends
to leave much wanted by way of completeness.209  This is, in part, be-
cause not all criminal records are submitted to the III.210  First, the
states are primarily responsible for determining their initial reporting
requirements and then actually reporting criminal records to the
III.211  Inconsistent reporting requirements among the states means
some criminal records never get reported to the FBI.212  Other
records, such as some fingerprint submissions, do not meet the quality
standards required for submission to IAFIS or the III.213  Modern
technological standards dictate the use of electronic “live-scan” de-
vices to capture and transmit fingerprints to the III.214  Traditional fin-
gerprint technology of rolling ink-blotted fingerprints on to paper
cards can provide low-quality fingerprint impressions and may be re-
jected under the III’s quality standards.215  As a result, the informa-
tional integrity of the III is poor, and it calls for more uniformity.216
When the discussion comes to concealed firearm licensing, these in-
consistencies may result in deadly consequences.  The patchwork sys-
tem of linking criminal records may fail to properly deposit and
connect criminal records to the searchable databases, and if so, certain
disqualifying criminal records will not be found using the currently
employed background check procedures.217
One solution to this inconsistency is to enact narrow reforms al-
lowing criminal justice agencies to fill the coverage gaps in the III with
206. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 6. R
207. Id. at 16–17.
208. Id. at 17–18.
209. Id. at 18.
210. Id. at 27.
211. National Crime Information Center, supra note 31. R
212. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 17. R
213. Id.
214. Id. at 92–93.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 17.
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non-positive identification criminal records.  In Illinois, law enforce-
ment agencies constantly update LEADS to include, among other
things, new warrants, orders of protection, and “information about in-
dividuals who have demonstrated that they are dangerous to them-
selves or others, or are suspected of being involved in activities that
constitute a violation of the criminal laws of the State of Illinois or the
national government.”218  Files contained in LEADS will not always
be supported by a fingerprint record, but they are among the variety
of records that can disqualify an applicant from receiving a concealed
firearm license.219  The sweeping regulations prohibiting access to
databases such as LEADS have already resulted in failed background
investigations of concealed firearm applicants, and the reforms sug-
gested here could help prevent future tragedy.
C. How to Implement These Reforms
The most direct method by which the federal government could
adopt these policy recommendations is to amend the definition of
“noncriminal justice purpose” in the National Crime Prevention and
Privacy Compact.220  The new definition could read:
The term “noncriminal justice purposes” means uses of criminal his-
tory records for purposes authorized by Federal or State law other
than purposes relating to criminal justice activities, including em-
ployment suitability, licensing determinations not including those
related to an applicant’s suitability to carry a concealed firearm so
long as the applicant has a right of appeal, immigration and natural-
ization matters, and national security clearances.
This proposed definition would specify that criminal records not sup-
ported by positive identification could still be used in concealed fire-
arm determinations.  One benefit of adopting this amendment to the
definition is that it would maintain the protections in place for other
noncriminal justice purposes that cannot be readily protected by pro-
cedural safeguards of the administrative appeal process.  Decisions re-
garding private employment following a background check, for
example, should not become subject to a government administrative
appeals process; it is simply beyond the scope of effective government.
Unfortunately, this proposed definition creates a procedural require-
ment in an otherwise straight forward definition.  The question of
what constitutes a right of appeal may be best handled by creating an
entirely new subsection of the Compact or its regulations.
218. ILL. INTEGRATED JUSTICE INFO. SYS., supra note 137, at 1–2. R
219. Compare  ILL. INTEGRATED JUSTICE INFO. SYS., supra note 137, with 430 ILL. COMP. R
STAT. 66/35 (2014).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 14616(b)(18) (2012).
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Another effective, though less direct, method of allowing the use of
criminal records not supported by positive identification during the
concealed firearm licensing determination could be to classify con-
cealed carry licensing as a function of the “administration of criminal
justice.”221  This amendment could be achieved by regulatory changes
similar to those proposed in 2007 by the United States Attorney Gen-
eral and the FBI.222  The rule proposed several changes to the Code of
Federal Regulations in accordance with the Law Enforcement Of-
ficers Safety Act of 2004.223  The Law Enforcement Officers Safety
Act exempts eligible retired Law Enforcement Officers from state
laws that require a license to carry a concealed firearm.224  Under this
exemption, criminal justice agencies must issue photographic identifi-
cation to the retired law enforcement officers.225  Various criminal jus-
tice agencies requested access to the III in order to conduct
background investigations of the agencies’ retirees before issuing the
required documentation.226  In response, the Department of Justice
proposed changing the regulatory definition of “administration of
criminal justice”227 to include “issuance of identification documents to
current and retired law enforcement officers.”228
The Department of Justice intended to grant criminal justice agen-
cies explicit permission to access the III because current regulations
only allow access to the III for background checks in the screening of
current or prospective employees of a criminal justice agency.229  A
plain language interpretation of current regulatory definitions does
221. See infra notes 222–28 and accompanying text. R
222. Carriage of Concealed Weapons Pursuant to Public Law 108-277; The Law Enforcement
Officers Safety Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 2817 (proposed Jan. 23, 2007).  The proposed regula-
tion’s title seemingly contains a typographical error by referencing the “Law Enforcement Of-
ficers Safety Act of 2003” because Public Law 108-277 is actually titled the “Law Enforcement
Officers Safety Act of 2004.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 926B–C (2012).
223. Carriage of Concealed Weapons, 72 Fed. Reg. at 2818.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 926C (2012).
225. Id. § 926C(d).
226. Carriage of Concealed Weapons, 72 Fed. Reg. at 2818.
227. The Code of Federal Regulations defines “[a]dministration of criminal justice” as “per-
formance of any of the following activities: Detection, apprehension, detention, pretrial release,
post-trial release, prosecution, adjudication, correctional supervision, or rehabilitation of ac-
cused persons or criminal offenders.  The administration of criminal justice shall include criminal
identification activities and the collection, storage, and dissemination of criminal history record
information.”  28 C.F.R. § 20.3(b) (2016).  Alternatively, the U.S. Code defines it as “criminal
identification activities and the collection, storage, and dissemination of criminal history
records.”  42 U.S.C. § 14616(b)(6) (2012).
228. Carriage of Concealed Weapons, 72 Fed. Reg. at 2819.  Other, less substantive, amend-
ments were also proposed, but these simply relocated existing definitions for the sake of con-
tinuity within the regulation. Id. at 2818.
229. Id. at 2818; see also 28 C.F.R. § 20.33(a)(1).
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not allow access to the III for background checks of retired
employees.230
In a similar fashion, the definition of “administration of criminal
justice”231 could be amended to include reference to law enforce-
ment’s function of carrying out concealed firearm licensing.  The im-
pact of this amendment would flow through layers of statutory and
regulatory definitions such that concealed firearm licensing would be-
come a implied facet of a law enforcement agency’s “criminal justice
activities,” thus allowing states to employ the use of criminal records
without positive identification during concealed firearm licensing de-
terminations.232  One cause for concern arises in states where law en-
forcement does not conduct the review of concealed firearm
applications.  For example, Georgia requires applicants to file with
their local probate court.233  These proposed amendments, admittedly,
would require a detailed, specific fix for every state-licensing scheme
that does not operate through state, county, or local law enforcement.
While this may not be ideal, it represents only one potential avenue to
fix the coverage gap in using criminal records to promote public
safety.
IV. IMPACT
Granting an exception for the use of non-positive identification
criminal records in concealed firearm licensing determinations will
have beneficial and significant public safety implications.  Expanding
the states’ authority to consider criminal records without positive
identification during firearm licensing determinations will (1) help fill
the informational gaps in the III, (2) provide designated firearm li-
censing authorities a more accurate and holistic view of each appli-
cant’s criminal history, and (3) promote public safety by preventing
dangerous individuals from lawfully possessing firearms in public.
A. Use of Non-Positive Identification Criminal Records Will
Supplement the III and Minimize Risk of Incomplete Data
States largely control the creation, handling, and reporting of crimi-
nal records to the III.234  The various state reporting requirements and
an undetermined number of procedural hiccups have resulted in a na-
tional criminal records system stricken with inconsistency and gaps in
230. Carriage of Concealed Weapons, 72 Fed. Reg. at 2818.
231. 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(b).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 14616(b)(6).
233. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129 (2016).
234. National Crime Information Center, supra note 31. R
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coverage.235  The federal government could help supplement the data
in the III by allowing states to access their own criminal records
databases.236  Allowing law enforcement to fill in these gaps with local
data will form a more complete record of certain individuals with
criminal records scattered across different jurisdictions,237 and a more
comprehensive criminal background record of potential firearm licen-
sees is essential to the states interest in promoting public safety.238
With greater access to criminal records information, law enforce-
ment agencies may see an increased expectation in their ability to ac-
curately conduct background investigations and manage firearm
application systems.  Illinois, for example, may place more scrutiny on
objections.  The “reasonable suspicion” standard may receive height-
ened treatment so that what was once reasonable is now unreasona-
ble.  With more data and knowledge, law enforcement’s level of
suspicion may in turn be more scrupulously questioned.
B. Give Law Enforcement Tools to Carry Out Its Duty
Firearm licensing tends to exist as a responsibility unique to local
and law enforcement agencies.239  Society grants some level of defer-
ence to local law enforcement by entrusting it with the responsibility
of firearm licensing and granting a subjective authority in the licensing
process.240  The total number of concealed carry applications filed in
Illinois during the year 2015 was approximately 55,500.241  Law en-
forcement professionals in the state have suggested that agencies can-
not evaluate every one of the 55,000 applicants consistent with the
standards of the Firearm Concealed Carry Act without access to
LEADS, the state’s most comprehensive criminal records database, to
supplement their findings (or lack thereof).242  The Illinois system was
designed with a focus on local input, but by denying access to
LEADS, law enforcement cannot access its go-to database that con-
tains the very information the Illinois General Assembly intended law
enforcement to access.  While well-intentioned, the policies in place
235. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 17. R
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See National Crime Information Systems, U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
tribal/national-crime-information-systems (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
239. See supra notes 193–97 and accompanying text. R
240. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/15 (2014).
241. Concealed Carry Permit Applications Drop Across Illinois, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2016, 11:56
AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-concealed-carry-permit-applica
tions-drop-across-illinois-20160201-story.html.
242. Editorial: Concealed Gun Law, supra note 3. R
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hamstring law enforcement’s ability to do the job it has been dele-
gated as it relates to concealed firearm licensing.
C. Reducing the Frequency of False Negative Background Checks
The III and its related criminal record databases remain fraught
with inconsistencies despite cooperative agreements and massive in-
frastructure investments made toward technological upgrades.243  One
study suggests name checks alone produce an inordinate amount of
false negatives—background searches that do not find a criminal re-
cord where one actually exists.244  This Comment, however, suggests
that by allowing the use of criminal records without positive identifi-
cation (not verified by a fingerprint record) in conjunction with finger-
print-verified records, agencies can minimize false negatives by
accessing to records not otherwise retrievable through the III.  The
inadequacies of the III are structural deficiencies of the system’s de-
sign, and the deficiencies cannot be accounted for or corrected by ad-
vancing the system’s technology or simply reducing human error.  The
patchwork of jurisdictions and various reporting standards make a
comprehensive and uniform system nearly impossible.245  The Depart-
ment of Justice should allow concealed carry firearm licensing entities
to address these deficiencies by widening the scope of inquiry to
records left unreported to the III.
The obvious implication of this discussion is the promotion of fac-
tors that tend to maintain high levels of public safety.  Law enforce-
ment’s careful and accurate scrutiny of concealed carry applications
will tend to reduce false negatives and prohibit dangerous individuals
from obtaining a concealed firearm permit.  Again, consider the tragic
case of Richard Idrovo.  Idrovo’s prior arrests and orders of protec-
tion were not reported to the III, and without those records, law en-
forcement believed he was a qualified applicant and approved his
concealed carry application. It was only after he committed a murder-
suicide that law enforcement searched LEADS and uncovered his
troubling history of domestic violence.246  In this case, the false nega-
tive result of a national background check proved deadly.  While
granting law enforcement access to LEADS does not necessarily guar-
antee a different result, the outcome is likely significant when repli-
cated across all concealed firearm applications.
243. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 16–18. R
244. NAT’L TASK FORCE, supra note 43, at 81. R
245. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 17.
246. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. R
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D. The Cost of Expansion
Implementation of the reforms suggested in this Comment will in-
stantly allow states with robust, appellate-like review mechanisms to
access non-positive identification criminal records for concealed carry
licensing purposes.247  States already maintain databases containing
criminal records without positive identification; so many if not all fifty
states would not be required to incur new expenditures or additional
appropriations to develop the digital infrastructure used to employ the
use of this data.248  Again, Illinois provides a strong organizational
model example for this implementation.  The Illinois State Police al-
ready manages the LEADS database for other purposes; allowing pre-
viously authorized users to access the files may result in a marginal
increase in network traffic, but expanding operations will not be a
burdensome undertaking.249
The true monetary cost of these reforms, however, will develop inci-
dentally to the implementation.  States that begin to utilize expanded
criminal records access will likely see an increase in objections, which,
in turn, will require more man hours spent reviewing individual appli-
cations.  This cost will express itself through overtime, newly added
staff to handle increase caseloads for administrative bodies, and actual
physical resources dedicated to the operation of these units.
These reforms would necessitate the development of a qualified ad-
ministrative review system in many states, particularly those that only
allow for judicial review of an adverse concealed carry decision.250
These states that only allow for judicial review risk flooding court
dockets.251  Crowded federal courts are not a new phenomenon,252 but
policy makers should avoid steps that would tend to perpetuate the
reality that is the overcrowded system of federal courts.253  For several
states, simple modifications to existing state administrative bodies can
fully equip states to provide review of concealed firearm application
decisions.  Expansion of the access to non-positive identification crim-
247. See, e.g., 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/20(a) (2014).
248. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 13. R
249. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1240.10(a) (2016).
250. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-207 (2015).
251. “Opening the floodgates” is a common rationale for judicial action, or inaction, but de-
fining a “flood” can be difficult.  Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the
“Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 407–08 (2003).
252. Crowded Docket Awaits Judges in Federal Court, CHI. TRIB. (July 21, 1940), http://ar
chives.chicagotribune.com/1940/07/21/page/16/article/crowded-docket-awaits-judges-in-federal-
court.
253. Overloaded Courts, Not Enough Judges: The Impact on Real People, PEOPLE FOR AM.
WAY, http://www.pfaw.org/sites/default/files/lower_federal_courts.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2017).
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inal records must be met with higher standards of administrative re-
view to quell the adverse risks associated with the individual discussed
in Part II.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal regulations regarding the use of criminal history records
in concealed firearm licensing determinations are well-intentioned,
but as this Comment contends, they are short-sighted considering the
states’ abilities to balance the risk to the individual of erroneous dep-
rivation with the states’ interest in maintaining high levels of public
safety.  Federal law should be amended to provide states a narrow
exception to these rules, and so states could begin accessing vital crim-
inal history records with minimal structural changes to their concealed
firearm licensing processes.  The data is available; the federal govern-
ment now needs to give states the discretion to use it.
As one author so aptly stated, “Whether a reader agrees or dis-
agrees with the Article’s policy recommendations, the Article can lay
the foundation for a better-informed debate, and a more realistic anal-
ysis of the issue.”254  This Comment is intended to highlight and offer
analysis on a relatively new concern for law enforcement professionals
that has otherwise received little attention.
Differences in opinion can and should be fleshed out through vigor-
ous public debate.  The end result may lead interested parties to dis-
cover several commonalities between the two opposing arguments.
Those of the public wary of concealed carry may tend to find the prac-
tice more favorable as they see applications become subject to more
comprehensive review.  In return, expanded access to criminal history
records will similarly afford applicants greater due process protec-
tions.  Stronger and more reliable due process protections should
build confidence that the review process will not be used to arbitrarily
deny highly qualified applicants the opportunity to exercise their
closely held Second Amendment rights.
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